Introduction
So-called free trade agreements and investment treaties are currently more about instantiating corporate power than they are about leveling the field for competitive trade and encouraging direct foreign investment in productive capacity. 1 The historic and now neo-liberal justifications for free trade are that it leverages comparative advantage so that countries produce and export raw materials and industrial goods with which they are naturally endowed or are relatively more efficient in manufacturing while importing cheaper, more efficiently produced goods from abroad. 2 The goal is to reduce trade barriers, especially tariffs but non-tariff barriers as well, that protect local producers and manufacturers from more efficient foreign competitors while allowing comparatively efficient domestic exporters the same advantages abroad. In a fictional world of full employment and full utilization of domestic resources, of internationally immobile labor and capital, and of perfect competition, comparative advantage purportedly increases economic efficiency, lowers costs of living, and produces a win-win trading system when trade is balanced. Similarly, the historic justification for the protection of foreign investment is that investors need reassurance to invest in other countries, particularly less developed economies where their fixed investments might be expropriated or their investment returns held hostage. Moreover, foreign investors need to be able to pursue their own self-interest rather than wait on their governments to protect them, and thus investors should be empowered to directly bring claims against confiscatory state action.
The high-theory appeal and canonical incantation of free-trade and investor-protection orthodoxies hides the brutal realities of the ascendant corporate power, most especially for the purposes of this article, the power of the innovator pharmaceutical industry that relies on the golden-goose of globalized intellectual property (IP) protections to extract monopoly profits for the sale of what are essentially global public goods. This industry has relentlessly pursued global minimum standards of patent and data protections within what became the World Trade Organization and now longer, stronger, and broader forms of protection via bilateral, plurilateral, and multilateral trade and economic partnership agreements. At the same time, there has been a proliferation of bilateral and regional investment treaties, the vast majority of which give foreign investors strengthened rights to bring private arbitration claims against government for policies and decisions that thwart their investment-based expectations of profit, including with respect to their asserted intellectual property rights.
Despite the deep irony of free trade agreements being subverted to codify and extend anticompetitive monopoly rights and despite the equally deep irony of foreign investors having greater enforcement rights than local investors, the joining of enhanced intellectual property rights (IPRs) and protections and strengthened investor rights is creating a wildwest opportunity for unbounded corporate power. Two current contestations show the dangers of this expanded power in sharp relief. In the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPPA), at the behest of its powerful pharmaceutical lobby, the United States is seeking the most extreme forms of pharmaceutical patent, data, and enforcement rights that have ever been proposed at the same time that it is seeking enhanced IP-related investor rights in the most recently leaked Investment Chapter. 3 In the pending investor-state dispute settlement case under an older but parallel North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) investment clause, an American pharmaceutical company, in Eli Lilly v. Canada, is for the first time claiming $500 million in investment-related damages because of Canada's sovereign decision to invalidate previously granted patents on two medicines on the grounds that those patents failed to meet well-established Canadian standards of patentability. 4 This article is not written as an abstract juxtaposition of these two current events. It is written to expose the dangers that countries face, especially low-and middle-income countries, in trade negotiations with the U.S., Europe, and Japan that seek to impose stronger patent, data, and market entry protections and at the same time seek to expand the armamentarium of enforcement powers available to pharmaceutical behemoths. Part II of the paper contains a brief introduction to the international IP regime, namely the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 5 and the TRIPS-plus pharmaceutical protections being sought in the mostly recently leaked TPPA Intellectual Property Chapter 6 and Transparency Chapter 7 still being negotiated between twelve Pacific rim countries. Part III gives a brief historical background on investment treaties and investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS). Part IV analyses the TPP Investment Chapter in more depth, particularly its provisions that deal with protection for and enforcement of IP-related investments. Part IV discusses the pending Eli Lilly v. Canada ISDS arbitration, including the claims and defenses of the parties. Part V concludes with a recommendation that investment chapters be struck from the TPP and other trade agreements or that such chapters should not apply whatsoever to the protection or enforcement of IPRs given the many other enforcement powers available to patent holders. The article claims that extending boundless corporate power to Big Pharma through adoption of ISDS for IPRs presents a grave danger to the communal right to health and the right of access to affordable medicines for all. 8
II. The Birth of Globalized IP Protection for Pharmaceuticals and its Proposed Expansion in the TPP
Although scholars trace the history of IPRs back several centuries, the effort to set any global standards with respect to patents occurred with the adoption of the 1883 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (Paris Convention) 9 and the 1986 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (Berne Convention) 10 and with the imposition of colonial IP regimes. 11 The strictures of the Paris Convention were quite limited; in terms of patents it principally required non-discrimination against patent applicants from other countries; provided for rights of priority, division of patents, and identification of the inventor; restricted the grounds for revocation; and expanded permissible uses of compulsory licenses. In Africa, Asia, and the Pacific, the parallel introduction of colonial IP laws began in the late 19 th century after the 1884 Congress of Berlin. Nonetheless, despite these partial successes, rich countries and IP-based industries were interested in extended the scope of IP protections beyond the Paris and Berne Conventions because both Conventions lacked effective enforcement measures and because their reach was not yet truly global.
In 1967, during a period of development-oriented contestation over IPRs by newly independent states, developed countries succeeded in establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), which was empowered to administer the Paris and Berne Conventions but also to promote harmonization of intellectual property legislation. "Within WIPO, developed countries conducted a protracted campaign to deepen, strengthen, and extend the scope and application of IP, but a resilient coalition of developing countries, led by Brazil and India, was steadfast in opposing such measures." 12 As a consequence of their failure to secure global standards of IP protection within WIPO, IP-based industries pushed their countries' trade negotiators to establish a harmonized system of IPRs and IP enforcement within negotiations within the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) The pharmaceutical industry played a particularly active role in initiating and consolidating a robust coalition of IP industries that persuaded trade negotiators, first in the US and then in Europe and Japan to champion a comprehensive and enforceable international IP regime, and to do so within the context of GATT negotiations. Pfizer in particular played a leading role ideologically throughout the 1970s and 1980s, especially in forging the Intellectual Property Committee, an international business coalition whose paper became the blueprint for IP demands by high-income countries in the GATT negotiations. The pharmaceutical industry was primarily interested in eliminating what it felt was unfair discrimination against the patenting of medicines, but it was also motivated to try to gain control over uses of its clinical and regulatory data to delay registration of generic equivalents, in essence seeking another form of exclusive rights. 14 Ultimately with a mixture of trade sanctions, threats, and agricultural and textile inducements, the TRIPS Agreement was adopted as one of the primary texts of the newly established WTO. The TRIPS Agreement established a global floor of substantive protections and enforcement measures for pharmaceuticals through patents and registration-related data rights. Pursuant to TRIPS, Member States are obliged to grant product and process patents to all applicants on an equal basis without discrimination with respect to the domicile of the inventor, the field of technology, or the eventual importation of the invention. 15 Patents must be granted for a minimum of 20 years 16 and allow the patent holder to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing patent-infringing products. 17 In addition to granting exclusive patent rights, the TRIPS Agreement also provides limited protections for pharmaceutical data submitted for the purpose of obtaining marketing approval. Such confidential data, at least with respect to new chemical entities and data, which required considerable effort to originate, is to be protected against unfair commercial use. 18 The pharmaceutical industry and rich country trade representatives have persistently claimed that TRIPS's data protection clause actually requires data exclusivity -a monopoly right that would prevent a country from referencing or relying on regulatory data previously submitted in order to grant marketing approval to a generic equivalent. 19 Despite the passage of TRIPS, Member States retained important interpretative freedom and specified flexibilities to protect public interests, including the right to health. These include rights:
engineered by U.S. knowledge industries; see also DUNCAN MATTHEWS, GLOBALIZING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS -THE TRIPS AGREEMENT (2002). 14 Baker & Avafia, supra n. 11, at 9. 15 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 5, Article 27.1. 16 Id. Article 33. 17 Id. Article 28.1. 18 Id. medicines in TPP Parties. 44 More patents might be granted on a particular medicine extending the time period of monopoly control and delaying generic competition. The duration of exclusive rights can also be prolonged because of patent term extensions that compensate for regulatory delays. In addition, new forms of monopoly protection are erected that delay marketing approval of generic equivalents, namely data exclusivity and patent-registration linkage. Patent holders will also have additional enforcement powers and deterrent remedies against alleged infringers and will have new opportunities to insist that their products be listed on therapeutic formularies and that their medicines be reimbursed at a high rate. As will be seen below, however, pharmaceutical companies are gaining more than the power to pursue enhanced private enforcement rights, or to seek governmental support in guarding borders and confiscating alleged infringing products, or even to seek state-state dispute resolution if their IPRs are not adequately protected. They also will have greatly expanded IP-enforcement rights directly against governments if their well-grounded expectations of profits are frustrated by adverse patent or regulatory rulings. It is to the issue of enhanced IP-investor rights that we will now turn our attention.
III. Brief Historical Background on Investment Treaties and Investor-State Dispute Settlement
Free trade agreements and bilateral investment treaties (BITs) typically contain investment clauses designed to attract direct foreign investment and protect the interests of foreign investors against grossly unfair, confiscatory, or discriminatory treatment. 45 In addition to defining the types of foreign investment that are entitled to protection, investment chapters typically allow for both state-state dispute settlement and investor-state dispute settlement, meaning that if a foreign investor believes that its investment has been unlawfully devalued by government action it can either induce its government to seek resolution on its behalf or directly launch arbitral proceedings against the offending government before a private panel of trade lawyers. Typical claims under investment clauses address: (1) alleged violations of minimum standards of treatment for foreign investors, i.e., fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security -basically policy protection and adjudicative due process; (2) direct or indirect expropriation, including what we call in the U.S. "regulatory takings"; and (3) national treatment and most favored nation principles which require host governments to afford foreign investors treatment that is no less favorable than that afforded to domestic entities in similar circumstances or no less favorable than that 44 The vast majority of investor-state dispute resolution claims are handled by the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) although there are alternative arbitral forums, regional and otherwise. 47 Most investment treaties allow 46 United States Bilateral Investment Treaties are designed to ensure that investments provide six basic benefits, often referred to as the "core" BIT principles:
• First, our BITs provide that investors and their "covered investments" (that is, investments of a national or company of a Party in the territory of the other Party) are entitled to be treated as favorably as the host Party treats its own investors and their investments or investors and investments from any third country. The BIT generally affords the better of national treatment (NT) or most favored nation (MFN) treatment for the full life cycle of investment, i.e., from its establishment or acquisition, through its management, operation and expansion, to its disposition.
• Second, BITs establish clear limits on the expropriation of investments and provide for payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation when expropriation takes place. • Third, BITs provide for the transferability of funds into and out of the host country without delay using a market rate of exchange. This covers all transfers related to a covered investment and creates a predictable environment guided by market forces.
• Fourth, the circumstances in which performance requirements can be imposed are limited.
The performance requirement disciplines apply to specific circumstances that would require covered investments to adopt inefficient and trade distorting practices (e.g., local content requirements or export quotas) as a condition for establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, or operation.
• Fifth, BITs give investors from both Parties the right to submit an investment dispute with the treaty partner's government to international arbitration. recourse to ICSID arbitration without first exhausting local judicial or administrative remedies, a right frequently not given to domestic investors with respect to exhaustion or post-exhaustion review. Typically, a panel of three private arbitrators is chosen to establish an investor-state dispute resolution tribunal, often from a surprisingly small pool of international trade lawyers. 48 Decisions are non-reviewable except through annulment proceedings that address a narrow range of tribunal "errors" and are not heard by judges but by another arbitral tribunal. 49 Although arbitral decisions are not precedential, panels frequently cite other tribunal decisions even as they also frequently ratchet up investor protections.
Investor-state dispute resolution is facing a crisis of credibility given its perceived bias towards investor prerogatives, but the analysis here focuses not on legitimacy debates as such, 50 but rather on a particular threat to access to medicines posed by pharmaceutical companies pursuing investor-state claims. More specifically, the analysis focuses on the pro-investor draft investment chapter in an ongoing regional trade negotiation -the TransPacific Partnership Agreement (TPPA) 51 The investor-state regime was ostensibly established to encourage direct foreign investment and thereby facilitate the efficient and free flow of capital to its most productive uses. By allowing private investors to seek remedies before purported neutral arbiters, foreign investors could avoid asset expropriation and adjudicative injustice. Larcenous and lawless governments would be deterred from confiscating hard-earned foreign investments and become compliant with or at least obedient to the rule of law. In the context of a global "development agenda," investment clauses were believed to provide a level of security that would incentivize foreign direct investment in the real economy and financial markets of low-and middle-income countries thereby accelerating the development of comparative advantage and lubricating participation in the expanding global economy. 53 A total of 3,271 international investment agreements (IIAs) were concluded between 1980 -2014, of which almost 90% were bilateral investment treaties (BITs). 54 The resulting complex web of agreements allows investors to shop for investment provisions that are most advantageous to them and, if necessary, set up a subsidiary for the purpose of asserting a preferred protected foreign status. Alternatively, most favored nation rules permit an investor to argue that it is entitled to the benefit of the "best" investment clause protections that has been granted to investors from any other state. 55 Although modern investment clauses and investor-state dispute resolution have existed since the 1950s, resort to them was limited during their first 50 years when only fifty investor-state claims were filed. 56 57 Investors had won only $3 billion from taxpayers in arbitral awards before last year, but a stunning $50 billion was awarded in 2014 in three closely related arbitrations involving stakeholders in the former petroleum company Yukos and the Russian Federation. 58 The amount claimed in ISDS cases in 2014 ranged from USD$8 million to USD$2.5 billion. 59 Moreover, the average cost of arbitral proceedings is nearly $8 million, although the Philippines' tribunal costs and legal costs in a single case exceeded $50 million. 60 This sea change in investor-state claims was triggered by the belated realization that not only could investors bring claims against banana-republic confiscations but against emerging economies and even advanced democracies whenever their expectations of profit were thwarted by local favoritism, shifting government regulations, adverse adjudicative decisions or other state practices. Accordingly, foreign corporations have used investorstate dispute resolution to challenge a broad array of environmental and land use laws, government procurement decisions, regulatory permitting decisions, financial regulations, consumer protection, public health, and public safety laws, and a range of other public interest policies. 61 Claims in extractive industries are common. For example, Churchill Mining has filed a $2 billion claim against Indonesia relating to its mining regulations. 62 ICSID recently ordered Ecuador to pay Occidental Petroleum $1.8 billion in a disagreement over an oil concession contract in the largest investor-state award to date. 63 Claims relating to environmental and public health hazards are also common. One prominent public health example is the pending arbitral claim against Australia under a 1993 Australia-Hong Kong bilateral investment treaty brought by a subsidiary of Phillip Morris International (PMI) challenging plain packaging restrictions on tobacco products. 64 PMI is pursuing its 2011 arbitral claim despite the Australian High Court's confirmation of the constitutionality of the Tobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011. 65 In the infamous Metalclad v. Mexico case, a U.S. toxic waste disposal firm challenged a Mexican city's refusal to grant a construction permit for a toxic waste facility until and unless the firm cleaned up pre-existing toxic waste problems of which it was aware when it purchased the property from a previous polluter. In an earlier instance, Canada reversed an environmental ban on a gasoline additive MMT, a probable carcinogen, after U.S. Ethyl Corporation filed a NAFTA investor-state claim against it. More recently, in another environmental case involving Canada, Bilcon v. Canada, Canada's effort to thwart a mining and marine terminal project because it would violate "core community values" was found to have violated the minimum standards of treatment standard in NAFTA. 66 Bilcon is seeking $300 million in compensation from Canada.
In 2008, the government of El Salvador refused to issue mining permits to Canadian gold mining company Pacific Rim, in order to protect local communities from the contamination of water supplies with chemicals such as arsenic. Pacific Rim then launched an investorstate dispute against El Salvador for $315 million for the loss of anticipated future profits. 67 Pacific Rim's US subsidiary brought it within the scope of the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) and the ISDS clause contained within that treaty. 68 The ongoing claim has attracted the attention of more than 300 NGOs, trade unions and civil society groups who vow to defend every last "drop of water" 69 in a country where approximately 1.5 million rural inhabitants lack access to reliable water sources. 70 In 2010, US-owned The Renco Group, Inc. filed a notice of intent to commence arbitration against the Peruvian government for denying it a third opportunity to clean up over a decade's worth of pollution from its metal smelter in La Oroya. 71 The Peruvian government shut down the metal smelter after Renco's persistent delay in implementing environmental improvements. 72 Many of La Oroya's children suffer from elevated lead levels and display symptoms consistent with lead poisoning, including anemia, convulsions, stunted growth and mental retardation. 73 Renco responded by bringing an investor-state dispute against Peru under the 2009 US-Peru FTA, demanding $800 million in compensation for Peru's alleged "unfair treatment" of Renco's smelter-operating subsidiary. The threat of expensive and protracted arbitration forced the Peruvian government to permit renewed operation of the smelter without pollution-capturing devices and renewed smelting has already produced reports of fresh emissions. 74 Peru's inability to protect the health of its own people demonstrates the devastating impact that investor-state disputes can have on public health.
In 2011, Germany's decision to shut down its nuclear power industry in the wake of Fukushima triggered a multi-billion dollar claim by Swedish energy company Vattenfall, which operates two nuclear plants in Germany: Krümmel and Brunsbüttel. Vattenfall demanded compensation of $4.7 billion under the ISDS clause of the Energy Charter Treaty. 75 The ability of a foreign investor to hold a national government to ransom over legislation designed to protect the health of its citizens highlights the extraordinary antidemocratic precedent set by investor-state disputes. ISDS provisions provide foreign nationals with greater rights than those enjoyed by domestic citizens by virtue of their ability to bring treaty claims. Consequently, the rights provided to foreign investors surpass the protections enshrined in Germany's basic law (Grundgesetz), which carefully balances public welfare objectives and investor rights. 76 While the public interest is a guiding principle in Grundgesetz, it may be completely ignored by an international investment tribunal whose priorities lie with investors. 77 Although many investor-state cases implicate public health and safety, prior to 2012 no pharmaceutical company had filed an investor-state challenge based on intellectual property rights. That moratorium ended on 7 November 2012, 78 when Eli Lilly and Company initiated arbitration proceedings under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) investment clause to attack Canada's invalidation of a patent on an attention deficit disorder medicine called Stattera. 79 In doing so, Eli Lilly is challenging a well-established patent rule in Canada, the so-called promise doctrine, whereby a medicine's "utility," and thus patentability, must be demonstrated or soundly predicted at the time of filing a patent. 80 Eli Lilly makes a number of specific investment chapter claims, discussed further below, including that the Canadian ruling involved a violation of minimum standards of treatment, indirect expropriation, and discrimination. The analysis below will first address the provisions in the Draft TPP Investment Chapter and their theoretical risk to access to medicines and then examine those risks in light of the actual claims asserted by Eli Lilly against Canada.
IV. The Leaked Draft Trans-Pacific Partnership Investment Chapter is a BoobyTrap for Access to Medicines
The leaked TPP Intellectual Property Chapter proposed by the U.S. has been analyzed briefly above with respect to the dangers it poses in terms of access to medicines 81 and elsewhere with respect to its IP enforcement provisions. 82 gives IP-"investors" new substantive "investment rights" that they could now directly, selectively, and cumulatively enforce against sovereign governments' regulations, policies, and adjudicatory decisions using Draft TPP Investment Chapter investor-state dispute resolution.
There are five main dangers in the Draft TPP Investment Chapter that threaten access to medicines:  First, the minimum standard of treatment rule, including fair and equitable treatment, and the indirect expropriation standard contain significant ambiguities that could greatly restrict countries' ability to enact, use, and defend lawful flexibilities that enhance access to medicines.  Second, national treatment and most favored nations provisions can be interpreted to prevent unanticipated forms of alleged discrimination against foreign investors.  Third, it is dangerous to cross-reference and incorporate IP rights into the investment chapter, given the extensive private and public enforcement rights that rightholders already have and given drug companies' proclivities to bring lawsuits against governments. 85  Fourth, the bracketed limited exception to IP-related investment rights for compulsory licenses and patenting decisions does not provide the security against investor claims that TPP Parties might need in order to truly safeguard lawful measures that promote 85 Using just India as an example, Bayer unsuccessfully sued India to achieve judicially mandated patent-registration linkage, a suit that was dismissed in the Delhi High Court with special leave to appeal dismissed by the leading to an outcome which offends judicial propriety." 92 The tribunal noted that this might be the case where there has been a "manifest failure of natural justice in judicial proceedings or a complete lack of transparency or candor in an administrative process." 93 More problematically, the tribunal decided that if a state breaches "representations" that were "reasonably relied upon" by investors at the time of investment, that breach constitutes evidence of unfair or inequitable conduct that violates the minimum standard of treatment. 94 Some commentators, citing other expansive tribunal decisions, argue that the minimum standard of treatment goes so far as to protect the "reasonable expectations" of an investor even in the absence of direct representations, let alone binding commitments allowing unfettered and immutable market participation or profit-making opportunities. 95 Such expansive interpretations of the "minimum standard of treatment" have made these claims an investor favorite. In nearly 75% of the investor-state cases that a U.S. investor has "won," the tribunal cited a "minimum standard" violation to rule against the respondent Party. 96 In the pharmaceutical context, foreign investors might claim that the "minimum standard of treatment" covers their reasonable expectations for future profits arising from the granting or even filing of intellectual property claims. Changing or re-interpreting substantive IP standards or guidelines judicially, administratively deciding pre-or post-grant patent oppositions in favor of challengers, or adjudicating exceptions to granted rights might all be interpreted as violations of minimum standards of treatment. In sum, whenever foreign IP rightholders disagree with judicial or administrative decisions or view those decisions as insufficiently transparent or candid, the foreign rightholder could potentially bring investment chapter claims directly against that government without ever being required to exhaust appeal mechanisms.
These concerns are no longer purely speculative. A major international corporate law firm, Jones Day, has directly counseled pharmaceutical companies about foreign investor claims they might bring against India:
[T]he basic patentability standards of the TRIPs agreement have been guaranteed to Novartis' investments in India ever since India agreed to become TRIPs-compliant in 2005; denying a patent in violation of those standards therefore may constitute a violation of the fair and equitable treatment standard. In Bayer's case, the sheer length of time for which the compulsory license was granted to the Indian company-i.e., the "balance term of the patent"-and the fact that no national health "emergency" exists to justify such a license over a "non-life saving drug," are just two reasons to suggest that India has run afoul of Article II.7 of the Draft TPP Investment Chapter also prohibits direct and "indirect expropriation" of a covered investment, which includes failure to pay fair market value upon expropriation. 98 Although there is an exception in subparagraph 5 with respect to "compulsory licenses granted in relation to intellectual property rights in accordance with the TRIPS Agreement," this exception would not appear to cover exceptions to data exclusivity or patent-registration linkage rights nor many other patent related claims. Even the last portion of subparagraph 5, which includes an exception to the expropriation rule for "the revocation, limitation, or creation of intellectual property rights, to the extent that such issuance, revocation, limitation, or creation is consistent with Chapter QQ.__ (Intellectual Property Rights)," 99 as important as it may be if adopted, does not give rights to create novel exceptions to intellectual property rights in the absence of full remuneration. Pursuant to the indirect expropriation rule, it would become unlawful, arguably, to create a new public health exception to data exclusivity or to require disclosure of the international proprietary name of active pharmaceutical ingredients on medicine-related patents. Likewise, payment of partial liability payments or royalties would not suffice to escape indirect expropriation strictures. Finally, the subparagraph 5 language would not prevent the foreign IP-investor from advancing even more fanciful interpretations of what is "inconsistent" with the IP Chapter as we will see further below with respect to the Eli Lilly v. Canada investor complaint. (ii) the extent to which government action interferes with distinct, reasonable investment-backed expectations (emphasis added); and (iii) the character of the government action. 100
Subparagraph (b) sets some loose boundaries on those expectations:
Non-discriminatory regulatory actions by a Party that are designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public health, safety, and the environment, do not constitute indirect expropriations, except in rare circumstances. 101 Although this public welfare exception may be helpful, it is not an absolute privilege. Investors can claim: (1) that their cases are the rare ones where even non-discriminatory regulation constitutes indirect expropriation; (2) that the regulatory actions are discriminatory, e.g., targeted solely at or disproportionately applied to pharmaceutical investors; or (3) that the interests being protected are not legitimate. The Article II.1 definition of "investment" is broad enough to cover medicines-related intellectual property rights (patents, data and other trade secrets) in that it only requires "commitment of capital or other resources, the expectation of gain or profit, or the assumption of risk (emphasis added)." 113 Pharmaceutical inventions typically involve investment of capital or other resources during the research and development process. Similarly, by granting rights to exclude others, IPRs certainly create an expectation of gain or profit -indeed an expectation of monopoly rents. Accordingly, unless IP rights are expressly excluded from the investment chapter and from the definition of "investment," there is a risk that IPRs, which routinely require both commitments of capital and an expectation of profit, would be implicitly covered. In this regard, it is also important to point out that the definitions of covered "investors" covers pre-establishment rights, rights that arise even before the foreign investment has been made. 114 However, the proposed definition of investment goes further to explicitly reference: (f) "intellectual property rights [which are conferred pursuant to domestic law]." 115 The unbracketed text protecting any and all intellectual property rights is problematic in at least five ways, given uncertainty about the intended breadth of its coverage.
First, "intellectual property rights" could be interpreted very broadly to include all of the IPRs codified in the loose language of the TRIPS Agreement. For example, TRIPS Agreement Art. 39.3 currently provides data protection against "unfair commercial use" for undisclosed data compiled at considerable expense and submitted to regulatory authorities as required. Major transnational pharmaceutical companies and EU and US trade negotiators have consistently interpreted this language as requiring data exclusivity, that is, monopoly control over the data so as to prevent regulatory reliance on or reference to the data when considering a generic company's attempt to register an equivalent product. 116 Many other countries and leading expert commentators believe that Art. 39.3 does not require data exclusivity, a protection explicitly rejected during the negotiation of the TRIPS Agreement. 117 At present, the only way to resolve this interpretive battle multilaterally is for an aggrieved WTO Member to bring a WTO complaint against another Member, such as India, which refuses to provide data exclusivity. However, despite intense industry lobbying on this issue, the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) has initiated only one such complaint against Argentina and subsequently abandoned it 118 113 Draft TPP Investment Chapter, supra note 3. 114 The definitions of investor of a Party and investor of a non-Party both reference "an investor that attempts to make" an investment in a country. Footnotes 9 and 10 both clarify: "For greater certainty, the Parties understand that an investor 'attempts to make' an investment when that investor has taken concrete action or actions to make an investment, such as channeling resources or capital in order to set up a business, or applying for permits or licenses." Id. However, if the Draft TPP Investment Chapter is adopted, even if the US proposal for data exclusivity in its IP Chapter were to be rejected, a foreign pharmaceutical company could bring an extra-judicial arbitral claim (e.g. violation of reasonable expectations covered by the minimum standard of treatment) against a TPP Party based on an interpretive dispute concerning whether TRIPS requires data exclusivity. In fact, Bayer sought a related, judicially imposed rule on patent-registration linkage in India and lost. 119 The company would hope that the revolving-door trade lawyers selected to lead the investor-state dispute resolution tribunal would adopt the company's position despite convincing expert opinion and widespread state practice to the contrary. In essence, the foreign investor will have gained an alternative forum for seeking to enforce novel interpretations of TRIPS and thereby gain new data monopolies. The TPP will give the foreign pharmaceutical IPinvestor, in all probability from the US or Japan, rights that no domestic pharmaceutical company would have. The foreign IP-investor could choose to appeal an adjudicatory loss and thereafter still seek separate investor-state arbitration or it could avoid the appeal process entirely and proceed directly to arbitration.
Secondly, not only might the vague and sometimes ambiguous language of TRIPS be interpreted expansively to justify an investor-state arbitral proceeding, but that same foreign IP investor might over-strenuously interpret the expanded IP rights conferred by the TPP itself. 120 For example, a Party might decide that it has a public-health flexibilityand a human rights need -to enact an exception to TPP-based data exclusivity rights in the event of the issuance of a TRIPS-or TPP-compliant compulsory license. The adversely affected "investor" might conclude that the express language of the TPP IP chapter does not authorize such an exception and that the failure to pay total compensation (not a mere royalty) is an indirect expropriation or alternatively, if the decision were adjudicatory, that its reasonable expectations of data-based market exclusivity have been violated. This latter, minimum-standard-of-treatment claim would be strengthened since there is currently little international state practice of enacting exceptions to data exclusivity. Once again, a U.S.-based foreign investor would not need to convince the USTR to file a WTO or TPP state-tostate dispute -it could do so unilaterally; moreover, it could bypass the Party's judicial procedures and jump straight into pro-industry arbitral proceedings. The company could safely assume that the revolving door justice of non-democratically selected arbitrators, who move seamlessly from representing IP rightholders, advising and representing governments, and donning the false cloak of arbitral neutrality, would prevail. Worse yet, the mere threat of such a lawsuit could deter Parties from adopting lawful public health measures permitted by TRIPS because of the prohibitive costs of arbitral hearings and the risk of excessive judgment awards should they lose.
IP/D/22/Add. 1), www.wtocenter.org.tw/SmartKMS/fileviewer?id=18205. As expected, Argentina did not accept the U.S. claim that exclusive rights should be granted for test data and left its law unchanged. 119 Tsui, supra note 85, at 577-88. 120 This possibility has strong support in another section of the Draft TPP Investment Chapter supra note 3, Art. 12.12.5, which, in bracketed text, creates an exception with respect to remedies for direct or indirect expropriation pertaining to the revocation, limitation, or creation of intellectual property rights, to the extent that such issuance, revocation, limitation or creation is consistent with the IP chapter.
Thirdly, a foreign pharmaceutical investor might simply rely on the TPP-compliant law of the TPP Party and claim that its investor rights had been infringed by an adverse decision on a pending IP claim. For example, if the TPP IP chapter requires countries to allow patents on new forms of existing medicines, a patent office might still conclude that a particular new polymorph form lacks an inventive step. The pharmaceutical company could argue that the TPP-compliant national law actually creates a presumption in favor of the patentability of new forms and thus that it has an expectation of profit from exclusive rights on an evergreening patent. Instead of challenging the denial of its secondary patent application in court, the company could bypass that step and immediately claim dilution of its putative -but not yet granted -IP rights and expectations of profit in investor-state arbitration.
Fourthly, there is a risk that a foreign IP rightholder might bring claims based on what it considers to be inadequate enforcement, e.g., the failure to criminally prosecute a trademark counterfeiter because of scarce prosecutorial and judicial resources or a failure to impose the level of damages that the IP rightholder proposes. Although the TRIPS Agreement mainly relies upon private enforcement, e.g., the creation of a procedurally fair judicial system for the private prosecution of IP infringement claims, the draft TPP IP Chapter creates multiple new enforcement rights with respect to civil remedies, criminal sanctions, and border measures. Failure to provide "fair and equitable treatment" in "criminal, civil, or administrative adjudicatory proceedings in accordance with the principle of due process" constitutes an actionable minimum standard of treatment violation under Draft TPP Investment Chapter Article II.6.2(a). Paradoxically, a government could face foreign investor claims for failure to unilaterally enforce what are fundamentally private rights -no longer could Parties use their TRIPS-compliant right not to prioritize publicly funded IP enforcement. 121 Note as well, the cumulative nature of IP-investors' rights: (1) they can bring private claims based on longer, broader, and more readily attainable patent rights and on new data exclusivity rights and they can obtain enhanced damages, injunctions, and seizure orders; (2) they can pursue stronger party-initiated border measures that could include seizures of goods in transit and rely on ex parte, sua sponte border measures by customs officials and seek criminal enforcement of trademarks and copyrights; (3) when frustrated, they can lobby for state-to-state dispute resolution under the TPP; and (4) they can now challenge the state directly with investor-state dispute resolution and/or seek state-state investment arbitration. Although IP right-holders already have unique and special enforcement rights under the US TPP IP Chapter, they now receive super-sized enforcement rights with investor-state arbitration.
Fifthly, there is a risk that an IP rightholder might bring a claim because of a governmental failure to intercept alleged IP-infringing in-transit 122 medicines via stringent border 121 Id., Article 41.5: "It is understood that this Part does not create any obligation to put in place a judicial system for the enforcement of intellectual property rights distinct from that for the enforcement of law in general, nor does it affect the capacity of Members to enforce their law in general. is not achieved. The U.S. filed a WTO complaint against Brazil on this issue in 2001, but the complaint was voluntarily dismissed in accordance with a consultation compromise. 135 Although Brazil has never used the impugned local-working provision, India has just granted its first statutory compulsory license based in part on Bayer's failure to produce any content locally. 136 Preserving sovereign rights to maintain or develop local pharmaceutical capacity is critical to access to medicines, not only to industrialization. When a rightholder has exclusive rights to a single source of supply, there are frequently monopoly-based affordability problems, but there are also high risks of interrupted supply if manufacturing, capacity, or quality assurance problems occur. Many countries choose to develop local pharmaceutical capacity precisely to ensure that they have locally managed sources of supply of essential life-saving medicines to supplement potentially fragile supplies available from only one or a small number of producers on the global market. three issues -did the trial judge err (1) by invalidating the patent for lack of demonstrated utility by misconstruing its promise, (2) by requiring too high a standard of utility, and (3) by deciding that Eli Lilly could not rely on the sound prediction of utility of the invention because the limited and short term study that it relied on was not disclosed in the patent application and because it did not provide an adequate factual foundation of the sound prediction/promise of the patent? 140 The principle evidence weighed by the Federal Court of Appeal was the patent application itself and a 21-person three-week, double-blind placebo cross-over study that showed a 30% greater reduction of ADHD in 11 of 21 patients. 141 The Federal Court of Appeal ruled that this short-term study was erroneously not disclosed in the patent application and even if it had been disclosed, the study would have been insufficient to predict, as promised, that Strattera would be an effective longterm treatment of chronic attention deficit hyperactivity disorder. 142 In terms of the governing legal standard, the Federal Court of Appeal held that the utility of a patent is determined by the inventive promise made by the applicant either directly or by "sound prediction" and that such a promise or sound prediction must rest on disclosure made in the patent application. 143 Eli Lilly submitted a second Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim to Arbitration to Canada on June 13, 2013, 144 adding a claim relating to its patent on the antipsychotic drug Zyprexa which is used to treat schizophrenia and related psychotic disorders ("the Zyprexa patent"). The Zyprexa patent was invalidated by the Canadian Federal Court on November 10, 2011 and Eli Lilly's appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal was again unsuccessful. Eli Lilly's claim against Canada now concerns the invalidation of both the Strattera and the Zyprexa patents.
V. The Eli Lilly v. Canada
On September 12, 2013, Eli Lilly submitted its Notice of Arbitration, 145 setting out in detail its grievances against Canada, all of which fundamentally relate to Canada's application of its "promise" doctrine to invalidate Eli Lilly's previously granted patents. Eli Lilly pursues claims with respect to violations of minimum standards of treatment and expropriation making the following allegations against Canada: a) Failure to meet its obligation under NAFTA Article 1709(1) to grant patents for inventions in all fields of technology that "are new, result from an inventive step and are capable of industrial application"; 146 b) Failure to meet its obligation under NAFTA Article 1709(7) to ensure that patent rights are enjoyable "without discrimination as to field of technology"; 147 c) Failure to meet its obligation under NAFTA Article 1701(1) to provide "adequate and effective protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights"; 148 On September 29, 2014 Eli Lilly submitted a Claimant's Memorial containing further details of its grievances against the Canadian government. Several paragraphs are devoted to an explanation of the "low threshold" set by the traditional utility requirement, from which Canada's "promise" doctrine represents a 'dramatic', 'arbitrary' and 'unpredictable' departure. 151 Utility, Lilly explains, is "binary" and does not require an assessment of the degree of comparative utility. 152 It simply requires that an invention be "capable or susceptible of being put to a specific industrial use." 153 Furthermore, Lilly claims that Canada's utility requirement "bears no resemblance to the longstanding patent utility standards of its NAFTA partners, the United States and Mexico." 154
The 'wrongful' nature of Canada's judicial decisions can be demonstrated, Lilly claims, by the fact that Zyprexa and Strattera have been successfully patented in 81 and 36 jurisdictions, respectively. 155 Canada is the "only jurisdiction in the world" that has invalidated these patents on the basis of inutility. 156 What Lilly fails to mention is that its Strattera patent was in fact invalidated by the U.S. District Court of New Jersey one month prior to its invalidation by the Canadian Federal Court, on the same grounds of inutility. 157
The so-called "promise" doctrine, far from being a recent Canadian innovation, is "a legal concept with deep historical roots and global reach". 158 The notion that patents contain promises of specific utility is found in many jurisdictions around the world (albeit under different labels and guises) and is essentially a method of purposive construction of patent claims. The 'promise' made by a patent is the representation that the patented invention will achieve and/or avoid specific outcomes, for example, the treatment of a specific disease in a certain manner. The Canadian doctrine essentially requires the court to construe the patent's explicit or implicit promise(s) within the context of the patent as a whole, through the eyes of a skilled reader, in relation to the science and information available at the time of filing. 159 Utility must be demonstrable at the date of filing; if it can only be predicted at 149 Id. at ¶ ¶ 74-79. 150 this time, there must be a factual basis and line of reasoning that supports the soundness of this prediction. 160 In its Claimant's Memorial, Lilly alleges that Canada has violated the following three obligations under NAFTA:
1. Chapter 17, which requires Canada to provide patents to inventions in all fields of technology without discrimination on the following grounds: a. Both patents were invalidated despite meeting the criterion of "capable of industrial application" in Article 1709(1); b. The promise doctrine discriminates against pharmaceutical inventions, contrary to Article 1709(7); c. The patents were invalidated on a legal ground that did not exist at the time the patents were initially granted, contrary to Article 1709(8); d. The invalidation of the patents represents a failure by Canada to provide adequate and effective protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights, contrary to Article 1701(1). 2. Article 1105, which requires Canada to afford 'fair and equitable treatment' to Lilly's investments by failing to provide: a. Protection against arbitrary treatment; b. Protection of legitimate, investment-backed expectations; c. Protection against discriminatory treatment. 3. Article 1110, which prohibits the direct or indirect expropriation of foreign investments except under certain conditions, none of which apply here: a. The patents were not invalidated for a "public purpose"; b. The promise doctrine was not applied on a "non-discriminatory basis"; c. The expropriation did not occur in accordance with the minimum standard of treatment required by Article 1105(1).
These arguments (and Canada's response) will be explored in further detail in the paragraphs below.
Alleged violations of Chapter 17
First, Lilly claims that the phrase "capable of industrial application" within Article 1709(1) is "well understood in the patent context" and merely requires that "an invention have the capacity to be put to a specific use in industry". 161 Accordingly, Lilly argues, "a good faith interpretation of 'capable of industrial application' and 'useful' in accordance with the ordinary meaning of those terms leads to a straightforward conclusion: an invention with the capacity to be put to specific use in industry meets the standard articulated in NAFTA Article 1709(1)". Lilly claims that this interpretation is supported by the subsequent practice of the NAFTA parties, 162 the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT), 163 and the TRIPS negotiations. 164 In its Counter Memorial, Canada assembles 8 experts and witnesses to support its defense against Lilly. Each expert or witness statement invariably chastises Lilly for its misstatements of U.S. and Mexican law, its misleading narrative of the 'harmonization' of international patent law and its history of speculative patent filing. 165 Canada describes Lilly's summary of the U.S. utility standard as "simplistic, inaccurate, and [ignorant of] the complexities of the standard", 166 particularly given that "U.S. law reaches many of the same results as do Canada's utility rules". 167 Moreover, like Canadian law, "United States law has evolved since NAFTA came into force, undermining any suggestion by [Lilly] that the Parties enshrined a particular standard in NAFTA". 168 Canada equally criticizes Lilly's description of Mexican patent law as "flawed, self-serving and inaccurate", 169 failing to acknowledge its distinct interpretation of "industrial applicability" and its substantial patent reform post-NAFTA. 170 Canada then provides a comprehensive history of WIPO, WTO and TRIPS negotiations to demonstrate that the "utility" requirement continues to evade international consensus. 171 Finally, Canada argues that the PCT is irrelevant as it "does not deal with substantive patent law issues at all". 172 It merely covers the basic requirements of "form and content" that must be met in order for PCT applications to be accepted and processed by national authorities. Moreover, filing in accordance with the PCT is no guarantee that a patent application will produce a successful patent that will survive judicial review. 173 Lilly argues that NAFTA Chapter 17 "explicitly contemplates that a Party 'may implement in its domestic law more extensive protection of intellectual property rights than is required' under Chapter 17", 174 but that Canada has "acted inconsistently with its obligations under Chapter 17" by providing less protection by means of creating an additional hurdle to patentability. 175 By invalidating patents despite "ample evidence" that the patented drugs had the capacity to be put to a specific industrial use, 176 Canada has "substantially redefined utility as contemplated by NAFTA", setting a dangerous precedent for the unilateral reinterpretation of 'internationally-accepted' meanings. 177
Lilly's second argument under Chapter 17 is that the promise doctrine represents de facto discrimination against the pharmaceutical sector, contrary to Article 1709(7). Although the Canada's promise doctrine applies prima facie to all technical fields, Lilly argues that, in practice, it has exclusively affected the pharmaceutical sector. 178 Lilly claims that from 2005, inutility findings jumped from 0% to 40% for pharmaceutical patents, while inutility findings for non-pharmaceutical patents declined within the same period. 179 Lilly even goes so far as to assert discrimination based on nationality, claiming that the impugned patents in all 23 inutility decisions were initially granted to pharmaceutical companies headquartered outside of Canada. 180 Canada rejects these allegations as "based upon a selective and misleading analysis of patent litigation outcomes". 181 Canada asserts that out of "hundreds of patent challenges in the 2005-2014 period, only three pharmaceutical patents have been invalidated on the sole basis of lack of 'utility', two of which are [Lilly's patents] which are the subject of this arbitration". 182
Thirdly, Lilly claims that Article 1709(8) protects its patents from invalidation based on legal grounds (i.e. the promise doctrine) which did not exist at the time the patents were initially granted. 183 Canada rejects this argument, asserting that the promise doctrine is based on longstanding principles of Canadian patent law that existed prior to the initial grant of Lilly's patents. 184 Furthermore, it has been a requirement of Canadian law since the 1970s that patent applications disclose a sound prediction of utility where utility cannot be demonstrated at the filing date. 185 Where a patentee relies upon a sound prediction of utility, the patentee must disclose the factual basis and line of reasoning that supports that prediction in order to distinguish an industrially applicable promise from a mere idea. 186 Finally, Lilly argues that Canada's invalidation of its patents constitutes a failure to provide adequate and effective protection of its intellectual property rights, in violation of Article 1701(1). 187 In this regard, Lilly mistakenly equates the "protection" of IPRs guaranteed by NAFTA with the imposition of specific, self-serving interpretations of substantive patent law on NAFTA parties. Contrary to this view, Canada claims that it provides full protection of IPRs through its domestic legal system, supported by full and fair judicial enforcement. 188
Alleged violation of Article 1105
Lilly also claims that the invalidation of its patents violates "at least three well-established aspects of the Minimum Standard of Treatment", including protection against arbitrary treatment, protection of legitimate, investment-backed expectations, and protection against discriminatory treatment. 189
Lilly alleges that the promise doctrine is "arbitrary" because it is "completely unpredictable and unreasonably difficult to satisfy". It claims that inventors "have no way of knowing what 'promises' a Canadian court might subjectively find in the patent application" and patentees "have no way of knowing how much evidence the court will require to satisfy those promises". 190 According to Lilly, "even successful, published, and statistically significant clinical trial results fail to satisfy the judges' standards of design, size or duration". 191 Moreover, Lilly claims that "Federal Courts often seek to construe the promise of the patent not from the patent claims that legally define the scope of invention, but from statements in the disclosure never intended to relate to utility". 192 This construction of promised utility, combined with the imposition of "heightened evidentiary burdens" and an additional disclosure rule for sound prediction of utility, combine to render the promise doctrine, in Lilly's eyes, entirely arbitrary. 193 Lilly adds, as a final insult, that the promise doctrine "leads to illogical and absurd results". 194 In its defense, Canada argues that the construction of a patent's promise is neither 'subjective' nor 'arbitrary' but rather "a fair interpretation of the patent in accordance with the long established 'purposive' and 'informed' approach to patent construction". 195 This requires, first, construing the patent as a whole, having regard to both the claims and the description in the patent specification; secondly, reading the patent from the perspective of a skilled reader equipped with common general knowledge in the relevant field; and finally, reading expert evidence on how a skilled reader would have understood the patent. 196 After applying these settled rules of interpretation, if the court determines that a skilled reader would have understood the patent to contain a specific promise, then that is the promise to which the patent will be held. 197 Accordingly, patents are interpreted, not "subjectively", but rather according to the application of "ordinary and settled rules of construction". 198 Furthermore, patents are not subject to a "heightened evidentiary" burden; rather, they benefit from a presumption of validity, and if that validity is subsequently challenged, the ordinary balance of probabilities test applies. 199 Judges do not arbitrarily "concoct' how much scientific evidence is required to show that a prediction of utility is sound; they assess, based on the evidence put forward by the parties, whether the skilled reader would have viewed the prediction as sound. This is not 'arbitrariness' -this is, Canada claims, the essence of the adjudicative process. 200 Lilly's expectations that Canadian law would remain frozen in time from the date its patents were first granted were, Lilly claims, "reasonable" because it "could not reasonably have expected that Canada would promulgate such a unique and arbitrary doctrine -particularly one that violates Canada's international obligations". 201 When Lilly initially patented Zyprexa and Strattera, it "legitimately expected that Canada's patent utility requirement would not be changed in an arbitrary and unreasonable manner". 202 There is no way it could have foreseen the erection of "new and unanticipated hurdles to patentablity," 203 which had "no basis in Canada's statutory patent law". 204 Canada rejects these arguments, asserting that "evolution in the law is an inevitable feature of any legal system" and nothing in NAFTA prohibits the domestic law of Parties from evolving over time. 205 Moreover, Lilly's patents were invalidated on the basis of "longstanding, rational, and fair rules of Lilly further claims that its 'legitimate' expectations were rooted in Canada's international commitments under NAFTA and the PCT. 209 The promise doctrine's "dramatic and internationally wrongful departure" from such international commitments was "outside the 'acceptable margin of change' that investors must reasonably anticipate". 210 Lilly also claims that its 'legitimate' expectations stemmed from the initial grant of the Zyprexa and Strattera patents. These patents, Lilly explains, were "more than a mere representation to Lilly from the government of Canada; they were a bundle of legally enforceable rights". 211 In response, Canada reminds Lilly that "every investor seeking a patent in Canada is well aware (because the Patent Act makes this clear) that the decision of the Patent Office to grant a patent is always subject to review by the Federal Court for actual compliance with the Patent Act. No reasonable patentee expects the grant of a patent … to be unassailable". 212 Furthermore, Lilly could not "reasonably expect Canadian courts to ignore longstanding principles and rules of Canadian law, whether or not [Lilly] itself was properly advised in this regard". 213 Lilly could not have legitimately expected that "latently defective patents would be enforced when challenged". 214 Canada highlights three fatal flaws in Lilly's argument that its 'legitimate expectations' require protection under Article 1105. First, Lilly failed to show that the theory of 'legitimate expectations' is a rule of customary international law protected by Article 1105(1). Secondly, the doctrine of 'legitimate expectations' cannot be applied to judgments of domestic courts interpreting domestic law. Thirdly, Lilly could not have reasonably held the expectations it claims; Canada's rules on utility are long-standing and the grant of a patent is always subject to reassessment by the courts for compliance with Canadian law. 215 To accept Lilly's arguments here would be to offer every disappointed litigant an international remedy for any domestic ruling it had "expected" to win. 216 Furthermore, notwithstanding Lilly's earnest claims to the contrary, "nothing in the record even remotely resembles the type of egregious behaviour which past NAFTA tribunals have said must be evident in order to breach Article 1105(1)". 217 NAFTA jurisprudence (largely ignored by Lilly) clearly shows that "a violation of Article 1105(1) will not be found unless there is evidence of serious malfeasance, manifestly arbitrary behaviour or denial of justice by the respondent NAFTA Party". 218 Lilly did not suffer from "lack of due process, procedural irregularities, political interference, lack of impartiality, pretence of form or bad faith or anything else which could offend judicial propriety". 219
The only basis upon which an international tribunal could impugn the judgment of a domestic court interpreting domestic law as a violation of international law would be a denial of justice -which is not the case here. 220 Lilly was afforded "full opportunity to plead its case" and the Court reached rational decisions based on extensive factual and expert evidence and "issued reasoned judgments relying on long-standing precedent and principles of Canadian patent law". 221 In total, nine different Canadian judges were involved in the Strattera and Zyprexa patent cases before the final invalidation decisions were reached. The cases were decided "reasonably and in good faith on the basis of evidence adduced by the Parties in an open adversarial proceeding" (emphasis added), in stark contrast to the private, unappealable tribunal decision which Lilly now seeks. 222 Canada claims that the doctrine of "legitimate expectations" is "fundamentally inapplicable with respect to judgments rendered by domestic courts acting in their bona fide adjudicative function of domestic statutory interpretation". 223 Lilly has not identified "a single instance of an international tribunal finding a violation of an investor's 'legitimate expectations' based solely on the outcome of a domestic court's interpretation or application of domestic law". 224 Henning Gross Ruse-Khan agrees that Lilly's purported expansion of the theory of "legitimate expectations" is unreasonable and unsustainable in this context. Ruse-Khan argues that intellectual property rights such as patents cannot provide the right holder with a legitimate expectation that measures interfering with the use of these rights in the host state will not occur. 225 A patent is a domestic statutory creation, granted upon the fulfillment of certain conditions, and if one of those conditions is not met, the grant can be revoked as easily as it was given. Ruse-Khan summarizes his position as follows:
In all cases, the grant of the patent certainly does not and cannot create any legitimate expectation that the exclusivity it confers is absolute and will remain without interference from accepted checks and balances inherent in the IP system. Instead, the expectations of the patent holding investor are a priori limited by the regulatory tools the domestic IP law of the host state foresees. Even in case a host state newly introduces such tools, or changes its policy of using existing ones after the investor has obtained his patent, the general acceptance and widespread state practice vis-à-vis these measures would strongly side against findings of interference with legitimate expectations. In Eli Lilly vs. Canada, the investor hence cannot legitimately expect from the grant of patents by the Canadian Patent Office (CPO) that those remain free from any validity challenges in the courts. Also a change in how the Canadian courts apply patentability standards such as utility or the disclosure obligation as such does not affect legitimate investor expectations: No expectation for a stable and predictable business environment can go so far that the circumstances prevailing at the time the investment is made must remain unchanged. Any resort to familiar and commonly used mechanisms to limit IP exclusivity … should never be considered as a breach of [fair and equitable treatment standards]. 226 Furthermore, Ruse-Khan argues that the negative, rather than positive, character of IP rights -which allow the right holder to prevent others from utilizing the protected subject matter but do not confer a positive right to exploit that matter -naturally permits national governments to impose further limitations on the use of the protected subject matter, in the form of regulatory controls. 227 The WTO Panel in EC-Geographical Indications confirmed that "the TRIPS Agreement does not generally provide for the grant of positive rights to exploit or use certain subject matter, but rather provides for the grant of negative rights to prevent certain acts. This fundamental feature of intellectual property protection inherently grants Members freedom to pursue legitimate public policy objectives since many measures to attain those public policy objectives lie outside the scope of intellectual property rights and do not require an exception under the TRIPS Agreement." 228 As Ruse-Khan concludes:
[T]he negative right to exclude others from exploiting IP-protected subject matter does not entail a guarantee against state intervention which imposes conditions upon the production or limits the use and sale of the patented product. For example, the introduction of price controls for a certain patented medication does not interfere with the patent for that medicine. Since such a measure is outside the protection IP rights confer, these rights cannot create legitimate expectations as to the (continued) absence of such measures. 229 In relation to Lilly's allegation of discriminatory treatment, Canada dusts off this argument with three swift strokes. First, Article 1105 "protects against unjustifiable discriminatory treatment in court proceedings founded on the investor's foreign nationality, not mere differential treatment. In order to challenge the judgment of a domestic court, [Lilly] would have to demonstrate that 'it was the victim of discrimination on account of its nationality'". 230 Secondly, all patent applicants, Canadian and foreign alike, across all industries, are held to the same standard of promised utility. Even if it were true that more pharmaceutical patents have been invalidated than in other industries, this is "symptomatic of the litigiousness of the pharmaceutical industry, not the discriminatory effect of Canadian law". 231 Finally, contrary to the misleading statistics peddled by Lilly, there have only been three patent invalidations based solely on inutility, two of which were the Strattera and Zyprexa patents disputed here. 232 
Alleged expropriation of Lilly's investments
Lilly argues that the invalidation of its patents constitutes both direct and indirect expropriation under Article 1110, relying upon what it calls the "classic" definition of direct expropriation as the "open, deliberate, and acknowledged takings of property". 233 Lilly argues that regardless of whether the expropriation is deemed to be direct or indirect, it must be compensable, as it does not fall within the exception provided by Article 1110(7), 234 it violates a rule of international law (NAFTA Chapter 17), 235 and it is arbitrary and conflicts with Lilly's reasonable investment-backed expectations. 236 Lilly then outlines why Canada's 'expropriation' of its investments does not fall within any permissible exceptions: (a) the expropriation was discriminatory as it treated pharmaceutical patents less favorably than patents in other fields of technology; 237 (b) the expropriation lacked a public purpose because it "serves no rational policy"; 238 and (c) the expropriation was not carried out in accordance with Article 1105(1) because it did not accord fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security to Lilly's investments. 239 Far from serving no rational policy, Canada's promise doctrine is designed "to ensure that patentees provide the consideration they promised in exchange for the grant of a 20-year monopoly … to ensure that patents are filed on the basis of true invention, rather than of speculation". 240 Moreover, Lilly's tendency to file numerous patent applications with little or no basis for the alleged new uses suggests a desire to monopolize areas of research and innovation, thereby demonstrating the importance of Canadian patent laws. 241 Between 1992 and 2004, Lilly filed patent applications claiming twelve alleged new uses of atomoxetine (Strattera) in the treatment of psoriasis, stuttering, incontinence, hot flashes, anxiety, learning disabilities, cognitive failure, conduct disorder, tic disorders, oppositional defiant disorder, pervasive development disorder and ADHD, with only half of these applications actually referring to experimental data. 242 Similarly excessive patent applications were filed (and later abandoned) for olanzapine (Zyprexa). 243 Lilly's history of speculative patenting effectively created a "thicket" of low-quality patent applications, which were later abandoned -precisely the kind of behavior which Canadian patent law is designed to prevent. 244 Eli Lilly claims that the invalidation of its patents has deprived Lilly's investments of "substantially all value". 245 The loss of patent protection for Zyprexa and Strattera allowed Lilly's competitors to enter the market and sell copies of the drugs and Lilly lost its ability to enforce its patent rights against infringers. 246 On the contrary, claims Canada, the assessment of whether a substantial deprivation has occurred requires a consideration of the investor's enterprise as a whole. 247 Strattera and Zyprexa form "just one part of [Lilly's] overall enterprise in Canada, which continues to grow and enjoys substantial profits in numerous lines of business. Nor did the measures prevent [Lilly] from continuing to produce and sell its atomoxetine and olanzapine based products. It still holds a valid [Notice of Compliance] permitting it to sell these products … at considerable profit." 248 One might reasonably note that Lilly in fact collected years of unwarranted supra-competitive prices on the basis of patent claims later found to be invalid. One might also reasonably note that both patents were nearing the end of their patent terms when invalidated.
Lilly claims that its argument is supported by past precedent, where "tribunals have concluded that judicial measures qualify as indirect expropriations when they result in a substantial deprivation and violate a rule of international law". 249 In this case, Lilly claims that the revocation of its patents violated international law by failing to provide the adequate and effective protection of IPRs demanded by NAFTA Chapter 17. 250 Canada sweeps away Lilly's claims with three clean brushstrokes. First, there cannot be an 'expropriation' of property when no property rights exist at all. There is no inherent right to a patent at common law; it is an entirely statutory creation and as it lives by the pen, so it dies. When a "domestic court has determined through the good faith application of domestic law that a property right is invalid … there is no 'taking' of a property right which did not properly exist in the first place". 251 The judicial invalidation of a patent cannot constitute expropriation as there is no transfer of property but simply a recognition that no property exists. 252 Accordingly, Lilly's patents were not 'property' interests capable of expropriation under Article 1110(1) because they were not valid property interests at all. 253 Secondly, Canada is protected by Article 1110(7) which provides that a revocation of an IPR cannot engage Article 1110(1) if it is consistent with NAFTA Chapter 17. Canada argues that it is "plainly" compliant with Chapter 17, contrary to Lilly's claims. 254 Canada's Patent Act provides that a patent may be available for any invention that is "useful", 255 and the criterion of utility is applied without distinction as to field of technology. 256 Moreover, the absence of any fixed international meaning of the term "utility" or the phrase "capable of industrial application" is evident from the text of NAFTA itself and "confirmed by the divergent practice of the Parties post NAFTA". 257 Thirdly, Lilly's expropriation claim fails to meet the three-step test for expropriation under customary international law because an invalid patent is not a property interest capable of expropriation. 258 In light of these arguments, Canada refutes Lilly's allegations that its bona fide judicial determination of rights at domestic law constituted direct or indirect expropriation. 259 It is important to note that Eli Lilly is making an expropriation claim despite a provision in NAFTA that is essentially identical to the proposed clause in the Draft TPP Investment Chapter supposedly creating a safe haven for compulsory licenses and for patenting decisions. From a policy perspective, allowing Lilly to succeed on such far-fetched arguments would turn investor-state arbitration tribunals into supranational courts of appeal. As Canada adeptly warns, if "a domestic court's adjudication of property rights can be transformed into an expropriation by alleged inconsistency with any of these other international law obligations, then NAFTA Chapter Eleven tribunals will be transformed both into tribunals with plenary jurisdiction over all international treaties and supranational courts of appeal in domestic property law issues". 261 Canada concludes by criticizing Lilly's attempts "to substitute Canadian patent policy and requirements for an alternative, detailed set of rules of its own making. [Lilly's] rules would promote the granting of patent monopolies on the basis of speculation, in a manner dissuading innovation, and with the public receiving only misleading and incomplete disclosure in return. These are not the rules set out by Canada's legislature in the Patent Act …These are not the rules established in international law." 262
Eli Lilly v Canada sets a dangerous precedent for pharmaceutical corporations to attack foreign governments for differences between foreign standards of patentability and the standards enjoyed by pharmaceutical corporations in their home countries. As Lilly was seeking additional patents on already-patented compounds, it needed to prove the superiority of its own drugs over other members of the patented class. In this regard, Canadian law is designed to prevent speculative over-patenting that would pre-emptively fence off areas of research on the basis of speculation. 263 Canada is entitled to design domestic patentability standards to prevent abuses of the patent system. However Eli Lilly is seeking to elevate its own competing views of how Canadian patent law "ought" to apply, into legally-enforceable "expectations". 264 Such an unprecedented incursion on national sovereignty will continue to occur as long as investor-state dispute settlement provisions are included within international treaties. While Canada possesses the financial capacity to defend itself against such attacks, developing countries may not.
VI. Conclusion: Strike the Investment Chapter or Otherwise Limit its Application to IPRs
Under the logic of Eli Lilly's investor-state claim, foreign investors' expectations have now become unbound. Even the doctrine of legitimate expectations, which is itself a huge stretch of operative minimum standards of treatment principles, is no longer tethered to operative due process (minimum standards of treatment) or to promises of regulatory coherence (indirect expropriation) or to equal treatment compared to domestic firms (national treatment). Instead Eli Lilly hitches its investment expectations to the best deal on IP achieved anywhere else in a cross-referenced investment agreement. Moreover, it suggests that its expectations can go in only one direction -upward. Any reversal, modification, or rebalancing 265 of existing IP protections would dilute the gleam in its eye -unlimited profits on the horizon -and justify a full compensatory damage assessment in its favor.
The practical implications of this radical assertion of investor privilege is two-fold. First, foreign IP investors, mainly from rich countries, could now directly sue virtually any government, rich or poor, to enforce any and all directly or indirectly incorporated IPrelated treaties and/or the highest standard of comparable national IP law found anywhere in the world. These investor prerogatives sit on top of state-to-state dispute resolution mechanisms under TRIPS and other trade agreements. They sit on top of more stringent border and criminal enforcement measures that consume state resources. They sit on top of state-state investment clause dispute resolution. And they sit on top of new deterrent civil remedies, mandatory injunction rights and draconian damages. In other words, IP rightholders' enforcement options are now unbound.
Secondly, a tribunal of three private international trade lawyers will now sit as an ad hoc subcommittee with power to review and veto every sovereign decision affecting the intellectual property rights of Big Pharma. Rejecting an IP-related trade pact, i.e. the U.S.-SACU FTA, 266 refusing to join an IP enforcement treaty such as the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, 267 tightening up standards of patentability legislatively, administratively, or judicially, 268 instituting new opposition procedures, 269 rejecting patent term extensions, 270 granting compulsory licenses, 271 denying data exclusivity or patent-registration linkage 272 or shortening data and marketing exclusivity on biologics, 273 creating a new bio-similars pathway, 274 requiring disclosure of clinical trial data, 275 or allowing parallel importation of medicines as the US Supreme Court did with textbooks 276 -all of these could potentially result in an investor suit and unappealable arbitral review. In other words, foreign IP rightholders' opportunities to oversee and set national IP policy and to ratchet it upwards are also now unbound. Although this article focuses on IP-related investment claims, it is worth noting that pharmaceutical-related investor-state dispute settlement claims could also be brought with respect to drug regulatory decisions affecting marketing approvals, 277 required warnings, and inspections and with respect to adverse decisions or due process defects affecting the listing of a medicine for reimbursement or setting the allowable reimbursement rates. 278 Unbounded intellectual property rights are oxymoronic given that they are purely and completely based on allowance and recognition by governments. 279 Although IP right holders like to elevate their exclusive rights into the realm of natural law, IPRs are most commonly recognized as instrumental rights that balance incentives for innovation, investment in quality, and creativity against access and in some instances disclosure, as is the case for patent rights. 280 As creatures of legislative and judicial balancing, IPRs are granted and modified according to changing social circumstances and emergent technologies. Subject only to superseding international, bilateral, or regional trade agreements or relevant constitutional protections, they can be strengthened or weakened, lengthened or shortened, and broadened or narrowed by limitations and exceptions. To argue that they set forth a stable, durable set of entitlements that can only be strengthened is naïve at best and duplicitous at worst. "Since innovators should know that the legal rules may change while they are engaged in research, during the registration process, or even later, it is difficult to see how a law (whenever adopted) that meets the standards required by international IP obligations can amount to an expropriation." 281 It is disinformational for drug companies to claim that compulsory licenses are confiscatory, since government rights to issue compulsory licenses have been codified in the Paris Convention for nearly 130 years 282 and the governments that have issued compulsory licenses or government use orders on medicines have had rights to do so enshrined in their national legislation for decades. Similarly, it is disingenuous to claim a violation of a minimum standard of treatment or of national treatment simply because you disapprove of a particular country's standard of patentability and because you obtain patents in other countries according to less stringent standards of patentability.
There are many reasons to strike the Draft TPP Investment Chapter, a chapter that dramatically increases corporate power at the same time that it restricts government sovereignty to regulate foreign and domestic business activities and to afford the enforcement of IP-related claims on an even-handed basis in domestic forums. However, too little attention has been given to the grave risks that the Investment Chapter poses to access to medicines. 283 Big Pharma has had a big hand in the US's proposed TPP IP Chapter and now in the Investment Chapter as well. Negotiating parties should reject both TRIPSplus IP standards and enforcement measures and substantive investment clause provisions and investor-state dispute resolution that will needlessly tie their hands in safeguarding the health of their people. Accordingly, the best solution with respect to IP-specific investment claims, and to the broader risks of investor-state claims altogether, is to delete the Investment Chapter entirely. There is no compelling reason why foreign investors should have rights that are not available to domestic investors or why investments should receive special substantive and enforcement protections that are not available to other forms of trade in goods and services. 284 The second-best solution to the risk of dangerous investor-state arbitral proceedings is to explicitly exclude IPRs from the Draft TPP Investment Chapter and to clarify that IPRs are not even indirectly protected by the definition of "investment." 285 This solution could best be accomplished by an addition to Art. II.3: "4. This Chapter does not apply with respect to the enforcement of any rights conferred pursuant to Chapter __ (Intellectual Property) or any other intellectual property rights contained in any other trade agreement, international treaty, or national legislation of any other country."
Either of these solutions would force foreign IP rightholders to assert their domestically derived IP-related claims in domestic courts, just as domestic IP companies must do. By excluding investor-state IPR claims, Parties could maintain sovereign control over the determination of IP standards and the adjudication of IP rights, retain freedom to develop their own IP jurisprudence, and relegate rightholders to pursue their claims in national courts alleging adjudicative and administrative improprieties, confiscatory measures, or other government wrongdoing. There would as well be supplemental protection pursuant 282 Paris Convention, supra note 9, Art. 5(A)(2). 283 Of course, the dangers are not limited to access to medicines. There have already been multiple foreign investor challenges to public health measures such as tobacco control and environmental toxins and degradation. But, conceivably there are foreign investor risks with respect to tightening labor standards, to adopting minimum wages, to enacting climate control regulations, to seeking access to green technologies, to sourcing educational materials and scientific journals, and many other matters of public interest, social justice, and human rights concern. 284 Dreyfus and Frankel reach a more moderate position that recognizes that there might be a value of protecting IP-related investment rights in some circumstances. Supra note 225, at 45. 285 See, Ho, supra note 225, at 75-77. to state-to-state dispute resolution with respect to alleged violations of intellectual property norms established in the TPPA.
The third-best solution is to adopt the bracketed language that allows investor claims only with respect to IP rights actually granted and judicially affirmed by the Party under its existing IP laws and hope that the far-fetched investor claims that Eli Lilly has asserted against Canada will be summarily dismissed and discredited. Limiting foreign IP "investors" to IP rights and expectations grounded purely in changeable domestic law, rather than their wish-list of externally established maximalist rights, might avoid abusive investor-state claims seeking to enforce ephemeral claims and yet unrealized rights under TRIPS, the TPP, or even the national law of other Parties. 286 Although solutions to the risk of unbounded corporate power to enforce IP rights in investor-state dispute resolution exist, those solutions will not be adopted if countries remain injudicious and if activists do not continue to highlight the risks of such claims. The risks concerning access to medicines are relatively clear and dramatic -as long as medicines remain inaccessible and unaffordable, people will pay with their lives. However, the risks are equally severe with respect to tobacco control, environmental hazards, and many other matters implicating human rights and social justice. It is time for legal academics and diverse social movements to shine an illuminating light on the danger of ever expanding corporate power and of private arbitration of public interests. The most immediate concern may well be the intersection of the TPPA IP Chapter, Transparency Chapter, and Investment Chapter, but there are similar dangers in the soon-to-be concluded EU-India FTA as well and in the pending U.S./E.U. Trans-Atlantic Trade and Partnership. If investor power remains unchecked, the weapon of investor-state claims will be used against poor countries and rich countries alike and monopoly power will become even further entrenched to the detriment of us all.
